On April 8, 2004 , the Heritage Foundation released a "Backgrounder" entitled Are U.S. Telecom Networks Public Property? by James Gattuso and Norbert Michel. 1 There, the authors claim that the current telephone network was paid for by the shareholders of the incumbent Bell monopolists, and not by captive ratepayers who bore the downside risks of network construction over the past century, primarily as a result of the government's use of franchised monopoly and price regulation in local telecoms (i.e., guaranteed rates of return funded by consumers).
To support this position, Gattuso and Michel utilize a financial model that relies primarily on an analysis of the amount of cash the Bell companies used to increase "property, plant, and equipment" ("PP&E"). However, Gattuso and Michel's financial analysis is replete with analytical errors and data problems. After correcting these errors, Gattuso and Michel's conceptual framework implies that ratepayers bore the downside risk for the construction of 96% of the current Bell Company local exchange network. Thus, ratepayers have a sizeable claim regarding the policy outcomes of efforts to promote competition to the incumbent Bell monopolists' wireline networks.
The Public's Network?
Gattuso and Michel argue that the local exchange network is not "public property" because the total capital expenditures by the Bell Companies since 1996 equals 76.91% of gross plant in that same year (175.4% of net plant).
Thus, according to Gattuso and Michel, "today's ILEC networks are overwhelmingly the product of recent private investment." The authors conclude that the public's claim on the network is no longer valid since the majority of the "network" was constructed during a period where consumers were not responsible for insuring an adequate rate of return for the Bell Companies. In essence, Gattuso and Michel propose that the ratepayers' claim on the local network can be no more than the ratio of "rateof-return protected" plant to total plant. According to their financial analysis, this ratio is small (about 23% using net plant).
Gattuso and Michel's financial analysis is flawed in (at least) two respects. Thus, price-caps (as implemented) have not eliminated the consumer-funded protection plan from low rates of return for the vast majority of the Bells' business (intrastate), and such protection was eliminated for interstate services until late year 2000 when the Bells began filing for pricing flexibility for special access services. 4 So, the relevant date for evaluating the extent to which the local exchange network is "public property" is year 2000 for interstate investment, not 1996 when the Telecommunications Act was passed. Intrastate investment remains, to a large degree, protected from downside risks through state-level price-cap plans.
Second, Gattuso and Michel's calculations are based on financial information provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission by the Bell Companies. As the authors recognize, the use of this data is problematic since it is adjusted for accounting depreciation and consequently does not measure a company's productive plant. Even more problematic, though ignored by Gattuso and Michel, is the fact that consolidated financial data also include plant and investments for non-wireline Bell operations (e.g., wireless, international, information services). 5 For example, Verizon's wireless, international, and information services accounted for 39%, 3%, and 1% respectively of their total capital expenditures in 2003. None of these investments are subject to the unbundling obligations of the 1996 Act. Clearly, therefore, the Bells' large capital expenditures on wireless telecom plant over the last few years are not relevant to the ratepayers claim on the wireline network constructed over the last century. To avoid the problems with the consolidated financial data, Gattuso and Michel's financial analysis is reconstructed using the ARMIS data filed with the FCC by the Bell Companies. This data includes plant and investment data related only to the wireline network. Critically, ARMIS also includes a measure of productive plant ("Total Plant in Service" or "TPIS"), so accounting conventions related to depreciation do not affect our analysis.
Total Plant in Service (TPIS)
The Ignoring the existing low-end protection provided the Bell Companies by state regulatory commissions, the vast majority of the current network was constructed during periods of consumer-funded protection. The figures in Table 1 show that 73% of the existing local telecommunications network was already in place in 1996. About 87% of the existing network was already constructed at the end of year 2000. Accordingly, even if the remaining financial protections are ignored, then the bulk of the wireline network has the nature of "public property."
Investment Deterrence?
Finally, Gattuso and Michel assert, without more, that unbundling mandates "discourage [] investment (at 4)." This particular claim is just one more in a long string of unsupported assertions regarding unbundling and investment. In contrast to the unsupported claim, econometric research has shown consistently that the unbundling obligations have increased investment by both CLECs and ILECs. 7 There are no econometric studies (of even marginal credibility) suggesting otherwise. 8 "Econometric research has shown consistently that the unbundling obligations have increased investment by both CLECs and ILECs."
More peculiar is the fact that Gattuso and Michel's claims about investment conflict directly with their own (albeit flawed) financial analysis. Indeed, it is difficult to assert that unbundling has deterred investment while also claiming that 77% to 175% of the Bell network has been replaced over seven years. Considering the average life of telecommunications plant is about 16 years, 9 Gattuso and Michel's own financial analysis suggests that the unbundling obligations have greatly increased the investment incentives of the Bell Companies.
Conclusion
After resolving some glaring defects, the analytical framework proposed by James Gattuso and Norbert Michel (on behalf of the Heritage Foundation) implies that 96% of the Bell Company wireline local exchange network is "public property." Gattuso and Michel's financial analysis also suggests that unbundling has had no negative impact on Bell Company capital expenditures since 1996. Thus, while captive ratepayers technically do not "own" the local exchange wireline network, they certainly paid for it and therefore have a sizeable claim regarding the policy outcomes of efforts to promote competition to the incumbent Bell monopolists' wireline networks. The local phone system is not only a public good, as defined by economists, it's also a public good as in who paid for it -the definition understood by everyday folk. Whether the regional Bell companies and their lobbyists want to hear this or not, the local phone system is not their property. It belongs to the public, having been built over the last century at enormous public expense. True, the federal government never directly paid for the phone system. Instead, it licensed a single company -the Bell Telephone System -to construct this network by charging the public phone rates far above the actual marginal costs of transmitting calls and guaranteeing the Bells an essentially risk-free return. Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No. 96-262, Fifth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14221 (1999) (Pricing Flexibility Order), aff'd, WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ). An analysis of the deregulation of special access in provided in G. S. DA 00-2617 (rel. Nov. 20, 2000 .
NOTES:
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In 2003, about 39% of capital expenditures were in the wireless segment, 3% were in the international segment, and 1% in the information services segment (none of these services is provided on an unbundled basis). See Verizon 10-K (2003). 6 For purposes of this analysis, the nominal series is converted to real using the Producer Price Index for Capital Equipment (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/31). TPIS includes only plant that is "Subject to Separations." 
